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People have a stronger preference for options encountered earlier or later in a sequence
than for options in the middle of the sequence. To account for these primacy and recency
effects, Mantonakis et al. (2009) sketched a sequential updating mechanism, the pairwise-
competition model. We propose a formal instantiation of the model and, using computer
simulations, examine how the sizes of the predicted primacy and recency effects are
affected by (a) variability in the quality of the options; (b) the number of options presented
(sequence length); (c) the level of choice inertia (i.e., the tendency to stick with the current
favorite); and (d) whether choice inertia dynamically increases over the sequence.We ﬁnd
that recency effects are reduced and primacy effects are increased with variability in quality
as compared to without, and that this holds regardless of sequence length. A sizeable
primacy effect occurs only with relatively short sequences or rather high levels of choice
inertia. Dynamic inertia increases primacy effects and reduces recency effects, and the
impact increases with higher inertia levels. We relate these results to empirical ﬁndings
and derive novel predictions from the model.
Keywords: primacy and recency effects, serial-position effects, inertia, sequential evaluation, preference
construction
A prominent feature of experience is that it unfolds serially, at
least to our minds. Due to constraints in attention, we process
events and objects one after the other (Simon, 1979). Does this
sequentiality of experience shape the decisions we make? It is well
known that the way preferences are constructed can be inﬂuenced
by numerous contextual factors, such as the framing of outcomes
as gains or losses, whether a preference is elicited by choice or by
evaluation, the emotional content of the task, or the similarity
of the available options (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Huber
et al., 1982; Slovic, 1995; Pachur et al., 2014; for an overview, see
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Moreover, how people search for
attribute information can impact their preferences (Weber and
Johnson, 2006; Pachur and Scheibehenne, 2012).
Given the constructive nature of preference, it is not surprising
that the serial position in which an option is presented appears
to impact how it is evaluated. For instance, Miller and Krosnick
(1998) analyzed election races and found a primacy effect, deﬁned
as a tendency to favor the ﬁrst option in a sequence over options in
the middle: candidates listed ﬁrst received more votes than other
candidates. In addition, Bruine de Bruin (2005) obtained evidence
for recency effects, deﬁned as a tendency to favor the last option
in a sequence over options in the middle: contestants in song
competitions received higher ratings the later they appeared in the
sequence. Page and Page (2010) found both types of serial position
effects when analyzing song contest series, with the recency effect
being more pronounced than the primacy effect.
Mantonakis et al. (2009) examined variables moderating pri-
macy and recency effects in choice, such as expertise and the
number of options presented (i.e., sequence length). They pre-
sented participants with either two, three, four, or ﬁve wine
samples. After participants had tasted all samples they indicated
their favorite. Although, unbeknown to participants, each sample
was poured from the samebottle, therewas a tendency to prefer the
wine presented ﬁrst. In longer sequences,moreover, highly knowl-
edgeable participants (as objectively assessed via a questionnaire)
also indicated an increased preference for the sample presented
last. Participants with little knowledge about wines did not show
a recency effect.
Mantonakis et al. (2009) sketched a process model—which we
term the pairwise-competition model (PCM)—to account for the
recency and primacy effects in preference. In a nutshell, the model
assumes that when encountering options sequentially, the decision
maker conducts a repeated pairwise comparison process in which
each new option is compared with the current favorite (see below
for details).
Our goal in this article is to propose a formal implementation
of the PCM that accommodates all of the components proposed
verbally by Mantonakis et al. (2009), and to systematically test the
extent to which the model predicts serial-position effects under
various conditions. First, whereas Mantonakis et al. (2009) exam-
ined the condition in which all options are of equal quality, we
investigate how introducing quality variability affects the size of
the primacy and recency effects predicted by the PCM. Second,
as expertise was shown to affect the occurrence of serial-position
effects, we examine the impact of different levels of choice iner-
tia (i.e., the tendency to stick with the current favorite), which
may be linked to expertise, on the model’s predictions. Third, we
formalize and test Mantonakis et al.’s (2009) proposal that choice
inertia might become stronger over the course of the sequence.
Fourth, because the authors found that the number of options
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in the sequence can inﬂuence the degree to which serial-position
effects emerge, we consider the potentially moderating role of
sequence length.
THE PAIRWISE-COMPETITION MODEL
The PCM combines two mechanisms that have previously been
proposed to underlie serial-position effects in preference con-
struction: repeated pairwise comparison (Houston et al., 1989;
Bruine de Bruin and Keren, 2003) and a bias for the ini-
tially presented option (e.g., Carney and Banaji, 2012). Specif-
ically, the model assumes that a decision maker encountering
options sequentially per default initially prefers the ﬁrst option
encountered. The second option is then compared with the
ﬁrst one, and one of the two is chosen. The third option is
then compared with the “winner” of the previous compari-
son, and so on. This sampling and updating process based on
repeated pairwise comparisons continues until the last option
in the sequence is reached and the ﬁnal winner has been
determined.
According to Mantonakis et al. (2009), the PCM’s “ﬁrst-is-best
bias accounts for the consistent primacy effect” (p. 1311). The
assumed pairwise-competition process, by contrast, can produce
a recency effect, “especially in the case of longer sequences, in
which an early option has to ‘beat’ more options to become the
overall favorite” (p. 1310). A recency effect should be reduced,
however, if the decision maker has a tendency to stick with the
current favorite—which, in line with Dutt and Gonzalez (2012),
we term choice inertia. Choice inertia may result for a variety
of reasons, such as reduced or conﬁrmatory information search
(Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Russo et al., 2006).
Given that choice inertia can be expected to reduce the recency
effect, Mantonakis et al. (2009) speculated that differences in
choice inertia may explain that participants with little knowledge
of wines showed no recency effect (see also Miller and Krosnick,
1998). People with more knowledge about the decision domain
(e.g., wine connoisseurs) may be more willing or able to criti-
cally scrutinize each newly encountered option than people with
less knowledge, and thus show lower (if any) choice inertia. For
instance, they may be better able to evaluate an option’s attribute
quality against the background of other previously experienced
options and thus to accurately identify a superior option when
it is encountered (e.g., Hsee et al., 1999). Finally, Mantonakis
et al. (2009) proposed that choice inertia may increase for options
encountered later in a sequence, as this assumption seemed to
increase the ﬁt of the model to their data.
Note that the PCM does not attribute serial-position effects
in preference to primacy and recency effects in memory, and
some authors have indeed argued that memory may not play
a key role. Bruine de Bruin (2005), for instance, found very
similar preference patterns when participants indicated their
preference (a) after each encountered option and (b) after all
options had been encountered. If memory were a key driver of
serial-position effects in preference, one would expect stronger
effects in the latter condition. Nevertheless, the contribution
of memory to serial-position effects in preference is not con-
clusively settled (e.g., Page and Page, 2010). A critical empir-
ical test (yet to be conducted), for instance, would be to
compare the size of the recency effect when participants are
asked for their preference immediately after presentation of
the options or after ﬁrst having worked on a distractor task
(inserted after the presentation of the last option). A reduced
recency effect in the latter case would indicate a contribution of
memory.
Due to its simplicity, the PCM offers an elegant account of
howpeople construct preferences among sequentially encountered
options. Moreover, it poses only moderate demands on working
memory and is computationally simple, making it a psychologi-
cally plausible model of preference construction (see Simon, 1955;
Gigerenzer et al., 2011). One limitation, however, is that Manton-
akis et al. (2009) explored the model only under the condition in
which all options were of equal quality. Given that quality differ-
ences among options are common in real-life settings, however,
it is interesting to examine whether the PCM also predicts serial-
position effects when the quality of the options varies. In fact,
it may well be that the predicted effects are strongly attenuated
when there is variability in quality, as the differences in quality also
shape people’s preferences. Further, it is currently unclear to what
extent other potentially moderating variables (e.g., the strength of
or increase in choice inertia and the sequence length) impact the
PCM’s predictions of serial-position effects. Next, we set out our
formal implementation of the PCM and then report the results of
a computer simulation submitting the model to a systematic sen-
sitivity analysis by varying key parameters of the decision context
and the decision maker.
METHOD
In the computer simulation, we implemented the PCM such that
L options are sequentially encountered and each new option in
the sequence is compared with the current favorite. Per default,
the ﬁrst option in the sequence is chosen as the initial favorite.
Choice inertia was implemented as a parameter representing the
probability π (0 ≤ π ≤ 1) that the current favorite is preferred
over the new option irrespective of its quality. With probability
1–π, the current favorite’s quality is compared with that of the
new option; at this stage, the probability that the new option is
chosen as the new favorite follows from the options’ qualities.
Acknowledging the probabilistic nature of choice (Mosteller and
Nogee, 1951), we used Luce’s (1959) choice rule, arguably the
most prominent probabilistic choice rule in decision science, to
derive that probability (for alternative approaches, see Rieskamp
et al., 2006; Stott, 2006). Speciﬁcally, the probability is a function
of the new option’s quality, Qnew, relative to the sum of both
options’ qualities (i.e., Qnew + Qold). Overall, the probability that
the new option becomes the new favorite is therefore determined
as follows:
p (new) = (1 − π) × Qnew
Qnew+Qold (1)
The old favorite remainswith probability 1–p(new). The inertia
parameter π was varied on four levels,π = {0;0.3;0.6;0.9}.
Quality variability was implemented as a normal distribution
of Q (truncated between 0 and 10) with a mean of M = 5 and a
standard deviation of δ= 5. In the conditionswithout quality vari-
ability, δwas set to 0. At each run of the simulation, L options were
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drawn randomly from the respective distribution and distributed
randomly across the L positions in the sequence. We tested the
PCM’s predictions at six sequence lengths: L = {2; 4; 6; 10; 12; 20}.
(Although choice sets of 20 options may be rare in regular stores,
they are common in online shopping.)
Mantonakis et al. (2009) proposed that choice inertia may
increase over the sequence. We formalized this notion of dynamic
choice inertia such that inertia at position i, πi, is deﬁned as (see
Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005):
πi = 1 − (1 − π1) × 2
1 + ic (2)
where π1 is the level of choice inertia at the ﬁrst position in the
sequence. The parameter c (0≤ c ≤ 1) governs the degree to which
choice inertia increases over the positions in the sequence, with
higher values indicating a stronger increase. In our simulations, we
set the c parameter to either c = 0 (static choice inertia) or c = 0.3
(dynamic choice inertia), implementing a moderate increase
of π.
For each of the 2 (quality variability) × 6 (sequence
length) × 4 (choice inertia) × 2 (static/dynamic choice
inertia)= 96 conditions, themodel determined the favorite option
at the end of the sequence. There were 100,000 runs per condi-
tion. For each condition, we determined the probability (across all
runs) that an option presented at a given position in the sequence
(of length L) would emerge as the ﬁnal favorite.
RESULTS
We ﬁrst focus on the conditions assuming static choice inertia.
Does variability in the quality of the options affect the degree to
which the PCM predicts recency and primacy effects? Figure 1A
depicts the probability that an option is chosen as the ﬁnal favorite
as a function of its position in the sequence; to illustrate the impact
of sequence length, the results are shown for sequence length of 6
(panels in the left column) and 20 (panels in the right column).
The black line represents the preference pattern without quality
variability; the gray line represents the preference pattern with
quality variability. As a reference, the dashed line represents the
preference pattern under random choice (i.e., where each option
in the sequence has the same probability of becoming the ﬁnal
favorite). As can be seen, the recency effect is substantially smaller
when there is quality variability than when not. The reason for
this result is that, with quality variability, the probability that the
object with the highest quality has already been sampled increases
FIGURE 1 | Predictions for the pairwise-competition model with
static choice inertia (A) and with dynamic choice inertia (B).
Probability that an option is the ﬁnal favorite (i.e., is preferred at the
end of the sequence) as a function of its position in the sequence. The
gray line plots the predictions when the options differ in objective
quality; the black line plots the predictions when there is no quality
variability among the options. The dashed line shows the pattern under
random choice.
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at later positions in the sequence. As a consequence, the proba-
bility of a new object becoming favorite decreases. Further, the
difference between the preference patterns with and without qual-
ity variability diminishes at higher levels of inertia. This is due to
the fact that at higher levels of inertia, quality differences play an
ever weaker role.
Figure 1A shows that also the occurrence of a primacy effect is
affected by quality variability; it is more pronounced when there
is quality variability than when not. As for the recency effect,
the difference between the preference patterns with and with-
out quality variability decreases at higher levels of choice inertia.
Figure 1A also reveals that the primacy effect emerges only if there
is a substantial amount of choice inertia. This holds regardless
of the existence of quality variability; without choice inertia (i.e.,
π = 0), there is no primacy effect at all. These ﬁndings clarify
that it is choice inertia—rather than the PCM’s “ﬁrst-is-best” bias
(Mantonakis et al., 2009)—that is responsible for the model’s pre-
diction of a primacy effect. The two columns of Figure 1A show
that these general patterns hold irrespective of sequence length.
How is the occurrence of primacy and recency effects affected
by sequence length? Figures 2A,B show the probability of the
effects for the different levels of L, again with the gray and black
lines representing the pattern with and without quality variability,
respectively. The dashed line represents the probability under ran-
dom choice (the line shows a decrease because the probability of
any option randomly becoming favorite decreases with increasing
L). As can be seen, relative to random choice, the PCMpredicts the
recency effect to increase and the primacy effect to decrease with
longer sequences. This holds both with and without quality vari-
ability, though the effects (relative to the pattern under random
choice) are smaller with quality variability than without.
Finally, Figure 1B (analogous to Figure 1A) contrasts the pre-
dicted preference pattern with and without quality variability for
the conditions with dynamic choice inertia. As can be seen, the
impact of quality variability (i.e., decrease in recency and increase
in primacy effects) also manifests under this condition; likewise,
the impact of sequence length and level of choice inertia play out
as under static inertia. Nevertheless, dynamic choice inertia does
inﬂuence the choice pattern relative to static inertia. A comparison
of Figure 1B with Figure 1A reveals that dynamic choice inertia
decreases recency effects and increases primacy effects.
DISCUSSION
The aim of our analysis was to examine, based on a formal
implementation of the PCM, the extent to which the model’s pre-
dictions of primacy and recency effects in preference are affected
by various features of the decision context—such as quality vari-
ability (an important realistic condition that was not considered in
Mantonakis et al., 2009) and sequence length—andof the decision
maker (e.g., choice inertia).
Our results showed that although the model predicts primacy
and recency effects also under conditions of quality variability,
the size of the predicted effects is clearly affected. Speciﬁcally,
recency effects are reduced and primacy effects are increased when
the options vary in quality. Further, choice inertia substantially
reduces recency effects and increases primacy effects, and recency
FIGURE 2 |The probability that the last option in the sequence is
the final favorite (recency effect; A) and the probability that the
first option in the sequence is the final favorite (primacy effect;
B) as a function of sequence length. The black line plots the
predictions when the options do not differ in objective quality; the
gray line plots the predictions when there is quality variability
among the options. The dashed line shows the pattern under
random choice.
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effects disappear altogether at high levels of inertia. In fact, our
results highlight that choice inertia is the crucial variable driv-
ing primacy effects in the PCM: without choice inertia, the model
does not predict primacy effects to occur (Figure 1A).With longer
sequences the recency effect is increased, but less so with quality
variability than without. The impact of quality variability also
holds under dynamic, increasing choice inertia, though primacy
effects are more pronounced and recency effects are weaker.
As mentioned earlier, different levels of choice inertia may
be related to different levels of knowledge—a key issue in
Mantonakis et al.’s (2009) investigation. What are the implica-
tions of our results for predicted differences in serial-position
effects between people with high versus low knowledge? Based
on Figure 1, decision makers with high knowledge (and low iner-
tia) should display mainly recency effects, and decision makers
with low knowledge (and high inertia), mainly primacy effects.
Moreover, these differences between decisionmakers with low and
high inertia are predicted to be more pronounced without quality
variability than with.
The ﬁndings of our analysis highlight that to test the descriptive
validity of the model and identify ways in which it may require
further development, future studies should speciﬁcally test the
predicted sensitivity of recency and primacy effects to differences
in quality variability, choice inertia, and sequence length. Evi-
dence from several existing studies seems to be consistent with the
model’s predictions as elaborated in our simulations. For instance,
Miller and Krosnick (1998) found larger primacy than recency
effects in election competitions when less information was avail-
able and for respondents who were less knowledgeable about the
candidates (see also Mantonakis et al., 2009). If lower levels of
knowledge are associated with higher choice inertia, this pattern
is predicted by our analyses.
The results of Bruine de Bruin’s (2005) study on voting in song
competitions are also consistent with the predictions following
from our model analysis. She studied experts (for whom choice
inertia should be low) who were presented with a long sequence
of options that (presumably) varied in objective quality. Under
these conditions, the PCM predicts strong recency effects and no
primacy effects. Indeed, Bruine de Bruin (2005) found sizable
recency effects but noprimacy effect (see also Page andPage,2010).
Overall, in addition to generating novel predictions, our results
thus offer a starting point for understanding more systematically
varied patterns of serial-position effects reported in the literature.
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